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INTRODUCTION 
Overcriminalization is often viewed as an issue about whether conduct 
should be punished criminally or whether it should be left to a civil 
adjudication of rights and remedies, including a governmental civil 
enforcement suit.  The label “criminal” is a special one that connotes 
society’s condemnation of certain conduct as deserving punishment, but it 
is also the community’s moral judgment that certain conduct is wrongful.  
Professor Sanford H. Kadish asserted almost forty years ago “that the 
criminal law is a highly specialized tool of social control . . . that when 
improperly used it is capable of producing more evil than good.”1  When 
the legislature defines ever-wider forms of conduct as crimes, the 
effectiveness of criminal law as both a deterrent and a means of affixing 
moral blameworthiness may be substantially diminished.  As such, overuse 
of the criminal law risks its utility to society.2 
                                                          
 * © 2005 Peter J. Henning. 
 ** Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.  I appreciate the comments 
and suggestions provided by the Wayne State University Law School faculty at a 
presentation on the topic, and to Professor Ellen S. Podgor. 
 1. Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 157, 169 (1967). 
 2. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703, 713 
(2005) (Overcriminalization Aencompasses a broad array of issues, including: what should 
be denominated a crime and when it should be enforced; who falls within the law's strictures 
or, conversely, avoids liability altogether; and what should be the boundaries of punishment 
and the proper sentence in specific cases.@); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” 
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The primary focus of those who condemn overcriminalization is on the 
legislature’s role in expanding the types of conduct that will be labeled 
criminal.3  However, the role of the prosecutor in applying the law is also 
relevant to the overcriminalization debate.4  Regardless of the scope of the 
laws enacted by legislatures, the prosecutor decides what charges to file, 
and whether the law should be applied in a mundane or novel manner.  
Professor William J. Stuntz argues that “the story of American criminal law 
is a story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of 
whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing 
marginalization of judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability 
rules rather than broader ones.”5  This is especially true at the federal level, 
                                                          
Mean “Criminal”?:  Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American 
Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991) (arguing that criminalizing negligent and intentional 
behavior blurs the distinction between tort and crime and, as a result, weakens the criminal 
law as a means of social control).   
 3. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter 1958, at 401, 417 (stating critically, “The statute books of the forty-nine 
states and the United States are filled with enactments carrying a criminal sanction which 
are obviously motivated by other ends, primarily, than that of training responsible 
citizenship.”).  See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal 
Sanctions to Enforce Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963) (outlining the 
problems inherent in a criminal justice approach to economic regulation). 
 4. See Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:  
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 
1545-46 (1997) (“There are two senses in which criminal sanctions might be said to be 
‘overused.’  One is that such sanctions are over-authorized by Congress and the state 
legislatures.  The other is that, where authorized, they are over-applied by prosecutors and 
courts.”). 
 5. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 510 (2001).  A parallel development exists involving the federalization of the criminal 
law.  Certainly, the Supreme Court has, in some instances, criticized the extension of federal 
jurisdiction over common street crimes.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 
(1995), which struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 as an improper use of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 
(2000), which struck down 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), a part of the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994, because it exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. 
However, there is a trend toward adding to the number of federal laws that can be used to 
punish conduct already subject to state prosecution.  The effect of this coordination of 
prosecutions enhances the penalties that can be imposed.  For example, this past year, 
Congress adopted a law making it a federal crime to murder a fetus, largely in response to 
the murder of Laci Peterson and her unborn child.  See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 
2004 (Laci and Connor’s Law), Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1841 (2004)).  This is already a crime in most states.  See Alan S. Wasserstrom, 
Homicide Based on Killing Unborn Child, 64 A.L.R. 671, 689-740 (5th ed. 2004) (detailing 
how various states prosecute the killing of unborn children).  Similarly, a Department of 
Justice initiative called “Project Safe Neighborhoods” moves individuals charged with 
crimes in state court into the federal system when they have prior arrests and possessed a 
weapon at the time of their offense, which under federal sentencing laws triggers a 
significantly increased sentence.  See Project Safe Neighborhoods, Project Safe 
Neighborhood Initiative Launched On Long Island—Sixteen Prior Felony Offenders Face 
Federal Firearms Charges (July 2, 2002), at http://www.psn.gov/Safer.asp?section=123 (on 
file with the American University Law Review).  The federalization of law enforcement can 
be used as a tool to impose ever-increasing sentences on those who would normally be 
subject to prosecution only in a state court.  Id. 
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where the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has been quite effective in getting 
Congress to approve legislation enacting broader crimes and—at least until 
recently—in shifting much of the power to set sentences to federal 
prosecutors.6 
The recent spate of misconduct in large, publicly traded corporations has 
led to what can be viewed as a new form of overcriminalization—the 
targeting of legal advice as an obstacle in pursuing the investigation of 
corporate wrongdoing.  This form of overcriminalization does not involve 
the adoption of new laws or an attempt to have courts adopt a new 
interpretation of an older statute to address changed circumstances.  It is 
hardly the case that federal prosecutors need new criminal statutes to 
prosecute misconduct by corporations and their managers, as they already 
have mail/wire fraud,7 securities fraud,8 obstruction of justice,9 and false 
statement10 prohibitions. 
The difficulty prosecutors face in prosecuting corporate misconduct and 
other types of white collar crimes is identifying the particular acts that 
violate the statute, and then amassing sufficient proof of intent to establish 
that a crime has occurred.  White collar crime investigations frequently 
take months, even years, to complete, and prosecutors must dig through 
mounds of records to determine who is responsible for the misconduct.11  
Except for some narrow regulatory and environmental crimes that are strict 
liability offenses, corporate crimes almost always require proof of specific 
intent.12  It is rare when prosecutors do not have to use circumstantial 
evidence to argue that the defendant(s)—both individual and 
organizational—had the requisite knowledge or purpose. 
When a corporation’s officers are the targets of the investigation, counsel 
will usually represent them, often paid by the corporation.  The presence of 
                                                          
 6. See Stuntz, supra note 5, at 545 (observing Congress’s willingness to give in to the 
demands of federal prosecutors even if their demands are inconsistent with the goals of the 
public). 
 7. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2004). 
 8. 18 U.S.C. § 1348. 
 9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1518. 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 
 11. For example, indictments of senior officers of Enron did not occur until over two 
years after the company’s bankruptcy, and the first criminal trial involving an Enron 
transaction only began in September 2004. 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435, 441-43 
(1978) (refusing to hold that the Sherman Act imposes strict liability on corporations or 
corporate officials for anti-competitive behavior, in part because strict liability in the context 
of corporate crime could deter businesses from engaging in “salutary and procompetitive 
conduct lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct” for fear of punishing good-
faith mistakes of judgment).  Noting that actors subjected to strict liability will exercise 
extraordinary care in their undertakings, the Court distinguished the antitrust context, in 
which over-regulation will discourage legitimate business activity to the public’s detriment, 
from laws regulating food, in which “excessive” caution by producers will promote the 
public good.  Id. at 441 n.17.  
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lawyers—frequently from large law firms with fairly sophisticated white 
collar crime practice groups that are stocked full of former federal 
prosecutors—makes the investigatory process much more complicated 
because skilled counsel know how to protect clients in these types of 
investigations and how to bargain for reduced charges and sentences.13 
In 2003, the then-Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson issued a 
memorandum with the title “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations” (the “Thompson Memorandum”), which announced a set of 
principles to guide federal prosecutors in deciding whether to charge a 
corporation with a crime.14  Among the principles federal prosecutors 
should consider are “the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its 
agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and 
work product protection.”15  While most commentary about the Thompson 
Memorandum focused on the waiver issue, there is another aspect that 
discloses an even more disturbing view regarding legal advice.  In 
assessing cooperation, the Thompson Memorandum states that the 
prosecutor should consider “whether the corporation appears to be 
protecting its culpable employees and agents” and can consider “the 
                                                          
 13. See Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 516-17 (2004)  (“Highly paid white collar criminal 
defense lawyers are more successful at almost every stage in the criminal justice process 
than their public defender counterparts.  They do a better job of persuading prosecutors not 
to indict, preventing the prosecution from obtaining evidence needed to convict, keeping 
witnesses from talking to prosecutors, presenting their case in the media, obtaining 
favorable plea bargains, pursuing post-conviction appeals, and arguing mitigation in 
sentencing.”). 
 14. Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) 
[hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj. 
gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm.  Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, Thomson’s 
predecessor, issued a similar memorandum in 1999.  See Memorandum from Eric H. 
Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Heads of Department 
Components and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) (discussing the bringing of 
criminal charges against corporations), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov:80/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html.  The Thompson 
Memorandum sought to explain in greater detail the DOJ’s position on the issue of charging 
corporations: 
The main focus of the revisions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the 
authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation.  Too often business organizations, 
while purporting to cooperate with a Department investigation, in fact take steps to 
impede the quick and effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing 
under investigation.  The revisions make clear that such conduct should weigh in 
favor of a corporate prosecution.  The revisions also address the efficacy of the 
corporate governance mechanisms in place within a corporation, to ensure that 
these measures are truly effective rather than mere paper programs. 
Thompson Memorandum, supra, at Introduction. 
 15. Id. at II. 
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advancing of attorneys [sic] fees” and sharing information pursuant to a 
joint defense agreement.16 
The payment of attorney’s fees by a corporation is not a failure of 
cooperation unless one views the presence of a lawyer for a corporate 
officer as an impediment to an investigation.  A lawyer is unlikely to 
recommend that a client, who is the target of an investigation, cooperate 
with the government, or at least, not without the protection of an immunity 
agreement or plea bargain.  This does not mean the lawyer’s advice is 
wrongful or designed to obstruct justice. 
Similarly, a joint defense agreement17 facilitates the pooling of 
information and representational tasks among lawyers representing 
different parties who share a common interest.  Courts recognize the 
propriety of joint defense agreements as an extension of the attorney-client 
privilege,18 and therefore, any discussions pursuant to these agreements 
will not be available to the government without a waiver by every 
participant in the agreement.19  Although the privilege makes it more 
difficult to gather information, one of the foundations of our legal system is 
that the government cannot compel disclosure of privileged 
communications absent proof that they were made to further a crime or 
fraud.20 
Defense lawyers representing individual officers certainly can make it 
more difficult for the government to investigate corporate misconduct.  
However, that alone is hardly a justification for viewing the payment of 
attorney’s fees or a joint defense agreement—both of which are completely 
legal and reasonable decisions by the lawyer—as a sign that a corporation 
is not cooperating with an investigation.21  
                                                          
 16. Id. at VI.B. 
 17. See The Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association, Legal 
Development:  Report on Cost-Effective Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 ALB. L. 
REV. 263, 310 (defining a joint defense agreement as a written agreement between multiple 
defendants who have, at a minimum, a willingness to cooperate on the case by sharing 
litigation costs and by preserving confidential information and may include an agreement to 
delegate particular responsibilities to certain defendants). 
 18. See, e.g., infra note 142. 
 19. See Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations:  Consequences of the Federal 
Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 113 (2003) (citing United States 
v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that even though 
federal prosecutors dislike the use of joint defense agreements, it is highly unusual for the 
government to threaten prosecution for merely participating in a joint defense agreement). 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989) (noting the existence 
of a crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege). 
 21. See John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 
579, 584 (2005) (noting that business people “have contractual, as well as informal 
customary obligations to their employees, customers, and suppliers.  Further, they have their 
ordinary ethical obligations as human beings to honor their commitments and to deal 
honestly with others.  These obligations can, and to an increasing extent do, conflict with the 
obligation to take the most effective steps to comply with federal law.  When the law 
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The drive to prosecute corporate misconduct, which frequently involves 
questionable but not obviously criminal conduct, has led the DOJ to adopt a 
position that views its ability to prosecute corporate crime as being 
hamstrung by the presence of lawyers.22  More than a nuisance, the DOJ 
views lawyers as a roadblock to criminal prosecution that, apparently, now 
requires the government to take a more aggressive approach to limit, if not 
eliminate, the protections afforded to the targets of an investigation. 
This new tack is symptomatic of the DOJ’s broader push against 
lawyers.  I do not assert that there is a “war on defense lawyers” that is part 
of a hitherto undisclosed plan to drive lawyers away from representing 
corporate officers.23  There is, however, a trend towards using the criminal 
law and the government’s investigatory tools against lawyers because of 
what appears to be a deep-seated suspicion of legal advice as something 
harmful or inappropriate.  Lawyers commit crimes, and there is no claim 
that they should be exempt from the application of the criminal law.  But, 
at the same time, the presence of a lawyer is not a red flag or in any way 
nefarious.  Prosecutors need to show greater respect for the attorney-client 
relationship, including privileged communications.  Efforts to enforce 
criminal law, which make legal advice a target of prosecution and an 
indicator of guilt, are a sure sign of overcriminalization. 
Part I of the Article considers why prosecutors mistrust lawyers by 
looking at cases involving lawyer misconduct that obstructs justice, and 
how even acting ethically means that a lawyer can act to frustrate a 
criminal prosecution.  While lawyers are viewed with mistrust, cases 
involving outright obstruction are rare and do not reflect the true role of 
lawyers in representing clients in criminal cases.  Part II assesses recent 
cases in which federal prosecutors have targeted lawyers for prosecution, 
                                                          
provides incentives to violate one’s ethical duties to others, business people face a difficult 
choice.  Federal prosecutors do not.  Business people must decide the extent to which they 
can ethically expose their firm to the risk of legal liability in order to meet their other 
obligations.  Federal prosecutors, whose only obligation is to the law, need only judge the 
level of the firm’s legal compliance.  Simply expressed, business people’s ethical dilemmas 
are not federal prosecutors’ problem.”). 
 22. See generally Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14 (providing guidance for 
lawyers working with cooperating corporations during a corporate fraud investigation and 
noting that corporations may purport to be cooperating with a DOJ investigation, while 
simultaneously trying to impede the DOJ’s discovery of the scope of the corporation’s 
wrongdoing). 
 23. But see Finder, supra note 19, at 113 (contending that because of an increased 
emphasis on corporate cooperation and indictment avoidance, companies essentially become 
an investigatory arm of the government); David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the 
Brink of a Brave New World:  The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 
37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 147 (2000) (arguing that the government prefers turning 
corporations into arms of law enforcement by emphasizing cooperation instead of 
preserving principles at the heart of our adversarial system).  The emphasis on cooperation 
creates divisive relationships between senior management and employees because of senior 
management’s rush to cooperate.  Id. 
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and asks whether the practice of law is starting to be viewed as potentially 
criminal.  Part III looks at the government=s most recent approach as 
shown in pronouncements regarding legal advice as potentially obstructing 
investigations of corporate misconduct.  In my view, the Department of 
Justice=s determination that a corporation providing a lawyer to an 
employee in connection with a criminal investigation can be considered 
obstructive.  This approach denigrates legal advice and moves beyond mere 
lawyer misconduct to seeking improperly the elimination of lawyers to 
further the government=s own interests, at a significant cost to the targets 
of corporate crime investigations. 
I. CAN’T WE TRUST LAWYERS? 
The DOJ’s approach to legal advice reflects a broader mistrust of the 
legal profession.  At least as reflected in television police programs, for 
which there is no shortage of fictional valorous officers solving complex 
crimes, lawyers (sometimes including prosecutors) are obstacles to be 
avoided or their legal advice is an unfortunate nuisance.  More importantly, 
it is assumed that a person—invariably the guilty suspect—who is advised 
by a lawyer will never cooperate or provide valuable information.  The job 
of the lawyer, apparently, is to make it much more difficult for the police to 
obtain information while shielding the guilty party from justice.24 
The phrase “lawyering up” has entered the popular lexicon as meaning 
that a person suspected of a crime will listen to the lawyer’s advice and will 
not cooperate in the investigation, thus thwarting a successful 
prosecution.25  Professors Bandes and Beermann described how, on the 
television program NYPD Blue, the prospect of a lawyer advising an 
investigatory target had significant ramifications: 
The detectives understand that if the guy they like lawyers up, they 
won’t get a confession.  The relentless pursuit of the confession is driven 
by the detectives’ assessment that they are unlikely to obtain a 
conviction without one.  In one episode, after Andy Sipowicz threatens 
to beat up a suspect in the sexual assault and killing of a young girl 
unless he confesses, another detective (not one of the regulars) criticizes 
Sipowicz because the technique might have jeopardized the case by 
scaring the suspect into lawyering up.  It is not that coerced confessions 
are wrong, it is that coercion, improperly employed, may result in a fate 
                                                          
 24. The media assumption is incorrect at least in drug cases in which significant 
mandatory minimum sentences create a powerful incentive for lawyers to engage in plea 
discussions early on in an investigation and provide valuable information to prosecutors to 
gain the government=s support for a departure from the required term of imprisonment. 
 25. See Adam Hanft, Neolawisms, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Feb. 2003, at 17 (explaining that 
NYPD Blue popularized the term “lawyering up” when referring to the difficulty of 
interrogating a suspect represented by a lawyer). 
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worse than death, the appearance of a lawyer.26 
There is no question that advising a person suspected of a crime to 
decline an invitation to cooperate in an investigation, at least by not 
speaking with the police before charges are filed, is proper and, indeed, 
sound legal advice.  It hardly needs to be said that the most damning 
evidence in a criminal trial is the statement of the defendant admitting the 
misconduct, regardless of any excuses or explanations that may be offered 
for the conduct.  Counseling a suspect to remain silent may frustrate the 
police, but the criminal justice system imposes upon lawyers the absolute 
duty to represent their clients within the bounds of the law. 
For white collar and corporate crime investigations, the presence of 
lawyers for targets, subjects, and witnesses is commonplace.  It is rare 
when a case does not involve an extended grand jury investigation, 
subpoenas for large volumes of records, and witness proffers—all mediated 
by lawyers for the company and individuals.  Yet, even in these types of 
investigations, prosecutors lament the presence of lawyers who slow down 
the process.27 
If lawyers only delayed investigations, there would be little reason to be 
concerned by the presence of a lawyer except for the increased cost and 
energy necessary to complete an investigation.  However, there is more at 
issue than just dilatory tactics by defense counsel.  The fear must be that 
lawyers, by their nature, obstruct criminal investigations.  One example of 
how lawyers are more than just an impediment is the notorious e-mail sent 
by an Arthur Andersen lawyer to the audit partner on the Enron 
engagement, seeking the removal of references to the involvement of the 
firm’s in-house counsel from a memorandum regarding whether Enron’s 
disclosures had been misleading.28  This single e-mail turned out to be the 
                                                          
 26. Susan Bandes & Jack Beermann, Lawyering Up, 2 GREEN BAG 5, 9 (1998). 
 27. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., Wearing a Bull’s Eye:  Observations on the Differences 
Between Prosecuting for a United States Attorney’s Office and an Office of Independent 
Counsel, 29 STETSON L. REV. 95, 146 (1999) (noting that, in the context of Independent 
Counsel investigations of wrongdoing by high level officials, “lawyering up” increases the 
duration of investigations due to the presence of lawyers).  Similarly, Professor John Barrett, 
another former Associate Independent Counsel, criticized the attorney’s fee provision of the 
now-expired Independent Counsel Act for inviting individuals to hire lawyers: 
It has become a trough that lawyers seek to feed in.  And the prospect of this 
ultimate reimbursement from the government seems to have encouraged all kinds 
of “lawyering up,” often orchestrated by White House Counsel.  It prolongs and 
complicates Independent Counsel investigations when even the most minor 
potential witnesses are represented by counsel who look forward to reimbursement.  
And this provision obviously increases the public tab for an Independent Counsel’s 
work. 
John Q. Barrett, Independent Counsel Law Improvements for the Next Five Years, 51 
ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 649 (1999). 
 28. See Green, supra note 13, at 504 (“Among the pieces of evidence that jurors found 
most incriminating was an email from in-house Andersen lawyer, Nancy Temple, 
instructing Andersen partner, David Duncan, to remove language from an internal Andersen 
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crucial piece of evidence showing Arthur Andersen’s corrupt intent to 
obstruct justice.29  The lawyer’s complicity was only emphasized when she 
asserted her Fifth Amendment right and refused to testify at trial.30 
How far can defense counsel go?  In Nix v. Whiteside,31 the Supreme 
Court made it clear that a defendant has no right to testify falsely, and that 
a defense lawyer who knows that the client will commit perjury does not 
violate the Sixth Amendment—or the ethical duties of the profession—by 
threatening to disclose that fact to the court, even though the information is 
privileged.32  The Court noted that “the legal profession has accepted that 
an [sic] lawyer’s ethical duty to advance the interests of his client is limited 
by an equally solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of 
professional conduct; it specifically ensures that the client may not use 
false evidence.”33  In Maness v. Meyers,34 the Court recognized that a 
lawyer cannot be held in contempt for advising a client to assert the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination and for refusing to turn over 
documents protected by the privilege because of the effect it would have on 
the provision of legal services.35  It rationalized, “If performance of a 
lawyer’s duty to advise a client that a privilege is available exposes a 
lawyer to the threat of contempt for giving honest advice, it is hardly 
debatable that some advocates may lose their zeal for forthrightness and 
independence.”36 
The zealous defense lawyer can, and perhaps must, make it more 
difficult for the government to obtain a conviction,37 but there is a limit to 
the lawyer’s ability to secure an acquittal for the client.  Can defense 
lawyers cross over the line and obstruct justice in their representation of 
                                                          
memo suggesting that Andersen had concluded that an earlier Enron final disclosure had 
been misleading.  The email also advised Duncan to remove any reference to consultations 
with Andersen’s in-house legal team, saying it could be considered a waiver of attorney-
client privilege.”). 
 29. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. 
granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (noting Temple’s reminder that Andersen staff should be in 
compliance with the company’s document retention policy in the face of an upcoming 
government investigation). 
 30. See Stephan Landsman, Death of an Accountant:  The Jury Convicts Arthur 
Andersen of Obstruction of Justice, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2003) (noting a 
heightened sense of suspicion after Temple and others invoked their Fifth Amendment 
rights). 
 31. 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 32. Id. at 173.  The Court reasoned that the right to testify, at a minimum, does not 
permit a person to testify falsely.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 168. 
 34. 419 U.S. 449 (1975). 
 35. Id. at 470. 
 36. Id. at 466. 
 37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (stating that a lawyer for a 
defendant in a criminal case may require the prosecution to prove every element of the 
case). 
HENNING 10/3/2005  1:35 PM 
678 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:669 
criminal defendants?  The sad truth is that there are more than a few 
examples to feed the perception that lawyers for criminal defendants will 
actively mislead prosecutors and judges in seeking an acquittal for their 
clients.  In In re Foley,38 a defense lawyer’s dealings with an undercover 
agent were captured on tape, including his persistent recommendation to 
the “client” about concocting a defense to a weapons possession charge.39  
In suspending the lawyer, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated, 
“What is unusual about this case is our ability to perceive with full clarity 
the depth of that misconduct and the ready ease with which the respondent 
engaged in it.  The respondent’s own words repeatedly reflect complete 
disregard, if not utter contempt, for the fundamental ethical obligations of 
an officer of the court.”40 
One recurrent example of defense lawyer misconduct involving 
deception involves substituting a different person for the defendant at the 
defense table during trial to have a prosecution witness make an incorrect 
identification of the person sitting next to the defense counsel as the 
perpetrator of the crime.41  Once the misidentification occurs, the defendant 
has a powerful argument that the witness’ testimony should not be credited 
by the jury or court. 
In People v. Simac,42 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a criminal 
contempt conviction of a defense lawyer who had a clerical worker from 
his office sit next to him at the defense table while the defendant sat in the 
back of the courtroom.43  He dressed one of them in a blue striped shirt and 
the other in a red striped shirt.44  In arguing that the evidence did not 
support the contempt charge, Simac asserted that he did not make any 
affirmative misrepresentation to the court regarding the identity of the 
clerical worker, as he carefully avoided any reference to him as the 
defendant or his client.45  Rejecting that argument, the court stated that “an 
                                                          
 38. 787 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 2003). 
 39. Id. at 563-64. 
 40. Id. at 568. 
 41. JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER 
§ 34:23, at 1178 (2d ed. 1996) (warning that a court may hold a lawyer in contempt of court 
for substituting another person, without the court’s approval, to cause a misidentification of 
the defendant).  In In re Gross, 759 N.E.2d 288, 289, 294 (Mass. 2001), the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court imposed an eighteen-month suspension on a lawyer who “concocted 
a plan” to have an alibi witness, who had a similar appearance to the defendant, impersonate 
the defendant at the second call of the case in the hope that it would induce the victim to 
misidentify the person who left the scene of an accident. 
 42. 641 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. 1994). 
 43. Id. at 417-18. 
 44. Id. at 418.  After the police officer identified the clerical worker as the person 
involved in the automobile accident, Simac called the clerical worker to testify to his true 
identity.  Id. 
 45. Id. at 419.  When the officer identified the clerical worker as the person involved in 
the accident, the trial judge stated for the record that the officer had identified “the 
defendant.”  Id.  The Illinois Supreme Court found that Simac’s failure to take any action to 
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attorney must not deceive the court as to the defendant’s identity despite 
the attorney’s obligation to vigorously represent his client.  Such a 
deception prevents the court from fulfilling its obligation and derogates 
from the court’s dignity and authority.”46  This is not an isolated example 
of this tactic, which has been tried over the years and which, when spotted, 
results in punishment for the defense lawyer.47 
The question of whether a lawyer’s effort to deceive the court constitutes 
obstruction of justice, rather than just an ethical violation or contempt of 
court, arose in United States v. Kloess.48  Kloess, a defense lawyer, failed to 
alert a state court that his client gave a false name when stopped for a 
traffic violation and when found to be in possession of a firearm.49  The 
client was on probation for a federal crime and could not possess a weapon, 
so Kloess’ failure to reveal his client’s true identity to the state court 
avoided having the client jailed for a federal probation violation.50  Kloess 
was charged with obstruction of justice51 by federal prosecutors for his 
conduct in state court.52  The charge required the government to prove that 
he engaged in “misleading conduct” with the intent to “hinder, delay, or 
prevent” information from being communicated to a federal judge about a 
crime or probation violation.”53 
In 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c), Congress provides lawyers with a defense to an 
obstruction charge.  The statute provides, “This chapter does not prohibit or 
                                                          
correct the judge’s misunderstanding was a deception.  Id. at 422. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See United States v. Sabater, 830 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1987) (maintaining that 
substituting another person for the defendant at the defense table violated the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility); United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(upholding a contempt conviction against an attorney who substituted another person for his 
client at the counsel table to cause a misidentification); Miskovsky v. State ex rel. Jones, 
586 P.2d 1104, 1109-10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (ruling that a lower court properly found 
an attorney in contempt for substituting another person for his client at the defense table, but 
finding the $500 fine excessive).  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 
488, 498-99 (Md. Ct. App. 1991), a defense lawyer was suspended for forty-five days for 
not informing a probation officer that his client had given a different name to avoid the 
discovery of prior convictions likely to have resulted in the imposition of a term of 
imprisonment rather than a suspended sentence.  A particularly egregious impersonation 
case is Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Raiford, 687 A.2d 1118, 1119-20 (Pa. 1997), in 
which a lawyer was disbarred when he had someone impersonate one of his clients and 
plead guilty to the possession of drugs found in a car owned by another of the lawyer’s 
clients.  The lawyer misled the impersonated client about the status of the charges so that the 
client would not learn of the scheme.  Id. at 1119.  The defense lawyer was eventually 
convicted of criminal charges for obstruction of justice, and, in upholding his disbarment, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that for a lawyer “[t]o engineer a criminal conviction 
of his own client without her knowledge is so outrageously unethical as to require no further 
comment.”  Id.  at 1120. 
 48. 251 F.3d 941 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 49. Id. at 943. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1515 (2002). 
 52. Kloess, 251 F.3d at 943. 
 53. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c)). 
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punish the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in 
connection with or anticipation of an official proceeding.”54  In Kloess, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that this provision “provides a complete defense to 
the statute because one who is performing bona fide legal representation 
does not have an improper purpose.  His purpose, to zealously represent his 
client, is fully protected by the law.”55 
Section 1515(c) is consistent with the requirements of the ethics rules, 
which recognize that defense lawyers in criminal cases can test the strength 
of the government’s cases even when counsel believes the evidence is 
sufficient to convict.56  This duty of zealous advocacy permits a defense 
lawyer to seek to undermine the credibility of government witnesses, 
regardless of whether their testimony is truthful, and to advance a defense 
that the client is not guilty even if the lawyer knows that the defendant 
committed the crime.57 
A lawyer’s use of the legal system’s tools to assist a client can become 
the basis for an obstruction of justice charge if the jury finds that the lawyer 
crossed the line between legitimate advocacy and a corrupt purpose.  In 
United States v. Cueto,58 the Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction of a 
lawyer for obstruction based in part on his filing for a restraining order 
against an undercover informant.  The government advanced a theory that 
the lawyer sought to protect his personal financial interests in his client’s 
illegal gambling business.59  The government argued that the litigation-
related conduct, while not illegal itself, was for the purpose of obstructing 
the government’s criminal investigation of the client.60  In finding the 
requisite intent to act corruptly, the Seventh Circuit stated, “As a lawyer, 
[defendant] possessed a heightened awareness of the law and its scope, and 
he cannot claim lack of fair notice as to what conduct is proscribed by 
§ 1503 to shield himself from criminal liability, particularly when he was 
already ‘bent on serious wrongdoing.’”61  While bona fide legal services 
fall outside the scope of the obstruction of justice statute, the lawyer’s 
                                                          
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c). 
 55. 251 F.3d at 948.  The court held that once a defendant fairly raises a defense under 
§ 1515(c), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct did not 
constitute bona fide, lawful legal representation.  Id. at 949. 
 56. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002). 
 57. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 213 
(2d ed. 2002) (“Is it ever proper for a lawyer to cross-examine an adverse witness who has 
testified accurately and truthfully in order to make the witness appear to be mistaken or 
lying?  Our answer is yes—but the same answer is also given by almost every other 
commentator on lawyers’ ethics.”); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 587 
(1986) (“Once the lawyer undertakes the defense, he or she may not refuse to take steps on 
behalf of the accused because of the lawyer’s belief in the guilt of the accused.”). 
 58. 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 59. Id. at 627-28. 
 60. Id. at 626. 
 61. Id. at 631 (emphasis added). 
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knowledge of the law and his client can be used to prove the corrupt intent 
necessary to obviate any protection provided to the lawyer under § 
1515(c).62  The responsibility of the lawyer to know the client and to 
communicate regularly in the course of the representation may in fact be 
the basis to demonstrate the intent to obstruct justice. 
Moreover, Cueto and Kloess show the precarious position of the lawyer 
whose legal representation of the client brings the lawyer in close 
proximity to the client’s misconduct.63  Although a lawyer may believe that 
his conduct is innocent, a lawyer may run afoul of the obstruction of justice 
statute while assisting the client.  In United States v. Kellington,64 
Kellington, a civil lawyer, accommodated his client’s request to assist in 
disposing of certain property, which landed him in the middle of an 
obstruction of justice indictment.65  After arrest, the client, a fugitive from a 
federal drug conviction who had been represented by Kellington in a civil 
case under an assumed name, asked Kellington to remove certain items that 
were hidden in his house.66  Complying with this request, Kellington, who 
professed ignorance of the nature of the materials and the extent of his 
client’s involvement in any misconduct, asked another person to destroy 
items that appeared to be evidence of criminal conduct, including cash and 
                                                          
 62. The intent requirement for an obstruction of justice charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 
is subject to dispute as to what constitutes “corruptly.”  A majority of courts employ the 
“improper purpose” analysis of “corruptly,” requiring only that the government show that 
the defendant acted with an improper purpose when engaged in the conduct alleged to have 
obstructed justice but not requiring that the conduct be wrongful in itself.  See United States 
v. Arthur Andersen, 374 F.3d 271, 295 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Congress knew that courts had 
uniformly defined ‘corruptly’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 as ‘motivated by an improper purpose,’ 
and it is logical to give the word ‘corruptly’ in § 1512 the same meaning that it has in § 
1503.”); United States v. Schotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the 
language used in § 1512 has been interpreted as meaning with an “improper purpose”); 
United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (construing that the use of the 
term “corrupt” in § 1512 requires that the government must prove that the defendant was 
motivated by an “improper purpose”); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 991 (1st Cir. 
1987) (explaining that “§ 1503 criminalizes conduct which obstructs or impedes the due 
administration of justice, provided such conduct is undertaken with a corrupt or improper 
purpose”).  The Third Circuit requires greater proof of intent than just an attempt to hinder 
an investigation, stating that “an individual can ‘persuade’ another not to disclose 
information to a law enforcement official with the intent of hindering an investigation 
without violating the statute, i.e., without doing so ‘corruptly.’”  United States v. Farrell, 
126 F.3d 484, 489 (3d Cir. 1997).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Arthur 
Andersen case to review the meaning of “corruptly.”  Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United 
States, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005).  
 63. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
327, 386 (1998) (“[T]he very nature of this pursuit places lawyers at risk because they deal 
more often than others with individuals who are themselves engaged in wrongdoing, and, 
especially in the case of criminal defense lawyers, an aspect of the risk is that the lawyer’s 
conduct or intentions may be misperceived.”). 
 64. 217 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 65. Id. at 1088-89. 
 66. Id. at 1088. 
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fake identity documents.67  The trial court refused to permit the jury to 
consider whether Kellington acted in a manner consistent with the ethics 
rules, which would establish a defense under 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c).68  The 
Ninth Circuit held this decision in error because 
Kellington was unable to frame and give content to the core of his 
defense—that Kellington was attempting (however imprudently in 
hindsight) to provide his client with bona fide legal representation, and 
that much of the conduct from which the government would have the 
jury infer criminal intent can be explained by his ethical obligations to 
[his client] . . . .69 
In Kellington, the lawyer professed ignorance of his client’s misconduct 
and testified that he would not have complied with the request had he 
known more about the client’s circumstances.70  What about the situation 
where a lawyer defends a client whom the lawyer knows is guilty?  Can the 
lawyer create a false impression of the client’s innocence to win an 
acquittal? 
An ethics opinion issued by the State Bar of Michigan considered 
whether a lawyer could call friends of the defendant as alibi witnesses to 
testify that the defendant was with them at the time the victim stated the 
robbery took place.71  The defense lawyer learned from his client that the 
victim’s recollection of when the robbery took place was later than the time 
when the crime actually occurred, due to the fact that the defendant had 
rendered the victim unconscious before robbing him.72  The alibi witnesses 
would testify truthfully that the defendant was with them at the time the 
victim said the crime occurred, thus creating a false impression with the 
court and the jury that the defendant had not committed the crime when, in 
fact, he had.73  The State Bar of Michigan opined that “[t]he situation with 
the friends as alibi witnesses in the instant case does not involve tampering 
with evidence.  One cannot suborn the truth.”74  Therefore, the defense 
lawyer had a duty to call the witnesses because the requirement of zealous 
representation of the client meant that “where truthful testimony will be 
offered, it seems axiomatic that a defendant is entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel in presenting evidence, even though the defendant has 
made inculpatory statements to his counsel.”75 
                                                          
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1099-1100. 
 69. Id. at 1101. 
 70. Id. at 1089. 
 71. Michigan Ethics Opinion CI-1164 (1987), available at http://www.michbar. 
org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ci-1164.html. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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If a lawyer can create a false impression with the judge and jury, is that a 
deception that could violate a criminal law?  While the State Bar of 
Michigan urged the lawyer to call the witnesses, in contrast, the state of 
Minnesota has a statute that may prohibit such conduct.76  The statute 
provides, “Every attorney or counselor at law who shall be guilty of deceit 
or collusion . . . with intent to deceive the court or any party . . . shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor.”77  In State v. Casby,78 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court upheld the conviction of a lawyer for violating the statute by not 
informing the court that her client gave his brother’s name when arrested 
for speeding and littering and then when pleading guilty to the charges.79  
The court stated that “the client was embarked on a course of continuing 
deceit.  The sixth amendment does not expect an attorney to assist a client 
in furthering fraud on the court.”80 
If the defense lawyer’s ethical obligation is to take advantage of any 
weakness in the government’s case, even if it requires the lawyer to create 
a false impression with the jury about the defendant’s innocence, then the 
defense lawyer is indeed more than just a minor hindrance in the criminal 
process, but a veritable obstruction to obtaining a conviction.  From the 
prosecutor’s point of view, the defense lawyer is something more than an 
embodiment of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when 
that assistance can obfuscate rather than illuminate the truth.  But it is not 
an obstruction of justice when the system depends on the defense lawyer, 
who protects the client by attempting, within the confines of the ethical 
rules, to obtain a result that may be contradictory to the defendant’s guilt.  
The defense lawyer is not a fate worse than death for the prosecution but a 
necessary component of the criminal justice system.  The fact that some 
defense lawyers may cross the line into improper conduct does not mean 
that lawyers as a rule obstruct justice or otherwise act improperly. 
II. TARGETING LAWYERS 
The fact that lawyers are prosecuted for crimes is nothing new.  Lawyers 
have been prosecuted for embezzlement of client trust funds,81 insider 
trading, and the use of confidential information for their own personal 
                                                          
 76. 2004 MINN. LAWS § 481.071. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 348 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1984). 
 79. Id. at 738-39. 
 80. Id. at 739.  Casby received a public reprimand and two years supervised probation 
for her conduct.  See In re Application for the Discipline of Camelia J. Casby, 355 N.W.2d 
704, 705 (Minn. 1984). 
 81. See, e.g., In re Ford, 44 Cal. 3d 810 (1988) (disbarring an attorney due to his 
admitted misappropriation of client funds held in trust); In re Lyons, 15 Cal. 3d 322 (1975) 
(ordering that an attorney be disbarred as a result of misappropriation of funds entrusted to 
the attorney). 
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benefit.82  These are clear abuses of lawyers’ positions of trust.  In recent 
years, prosecutions of lawyers have occurred for money laundering related 
to the payment of legal fees83 and for providing money generated by drug 
sales to arrested drug cartel couriers to maintain their silence and to avoid 
the implication of the cartel’s leader.84  In United States v. Gellene,85 the 
government successfully prosecuted a prominent New York City 
bankruptcy lawyer from a distinguished law firm for bankruptcy fraud.  
The government prosecuted him because of his failure to fully disclose his 
representation of other claimants in the bankruptcy proceeding, even 
though the government never alleged that his legal work was affected by 
the undisclosed conflicts.86  What is rather unnerving is that, throughout 
these criminal investigations, prosecutors have used lawyers as sources of 
information about the wrongdoing of their clients.87 
If lawyers are untrustworthy when they represent clients in criminal 
investigations, then does it follow that they engage in criminal conduct, 
constituting assistance in criminal schemes, when they provide legal advice 
                                                          
 82. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (upholding the 
conviction of a lawyer who used confidential information from a client when considering a 
hostile takeover to purchase securities of the target corporation); United States v. ReBrook, 
837 F. Supp. 162, 171 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (finding that a lawyer charged with insider 
trading and mail fraud for using confidential information from a client to purchase shares in 
companies owed a duty to the public and to his employer not to improperly use such 
information), rev’d, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Singer, 786 F. Supp. 1158, 1168-69 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (hearing the SEC’s argument that a lawyer traded securities of a company 
based upon information received from a corporate director about a possible leveraged buy-
out). 
 83. See United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001) (convicting defense 
lawyers for money laundering in a case involving transfers of funds from a client’s United 
States account, comprised of proceeds from Medicare fraud, through a financial institution 
in Curaçao to accounts in Israel). 
 84. See United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he evidence 
supported a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that, to the extent Rodriguez-Orejuela 
had other business interests, Abbell knew that those business interests were so intertwined 
with Rodriguez-Orejuela’s narcotics trafficking that money paid by Rodriguez-Orejuela 
came, at a minimum, from commingled funds.”). 
 85. 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 86. Id. at 588 (“We have no doubt that a misstatement in a Rule 2014 [disclosure] 
statement by an attorney about other affiliations constitutes a material misstatement. . . .  
This requirement goes to the heart of the integrity of the administration of the bankruptcy 
estate.”). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328 (7th Cir.  1992) (discussing the 
government’s obtainment of documents from a lawyer who had been convicted of 
bankruptcy fraud and who decided to cooperate with a government investigation by 
providing information about another client investigated in a separate bankruptcy fraud); 
United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming the admission of evidence 
gained by the use of a listening device by a lawyer who was a target of a corruption 
investigation and who agreed to wear a listening device in meetings with his client regarding 
possible drug transactions); cf. United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing concerning whether the theft of documents 
from a lawyer’s office used to convict that lawyer for aiding bankruptcy fraud was under the 
direction of a government agent). 
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in everyday business transactions?  Lawyers are much more involved in 
advising clients about how to conduct their business than ever before due to 
the pervasiveness of the regulation of economic activity.88  When the 
lawyer moves from the courtroom to the boardroom, the possibility of a 
lawyer becoming enmeshed in questionable conduct increases 
substantially. 
Many prosecutions of lawyers stem from their conduct in a personal 
capacity or from their dealings with a court.  In recent years, however, 
there has been a substantial increase in the number of criminal prosecutions 
of lawyers based on their legal advice to businesses—far removed from the 
courtroom and the representation of criminal defendants.  As the 
government targets lawyers for how they practice their profession, the 
question arises as to whether the government views legal advice as another 
form of criminality in much the same way that a conspiratorial agreement 
is subject to prosecution. 
The First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cintolo89 highlights the 
view that legal representation is simply another form of potential 
misconduct.  In Cintolo, the defendant-lawyer represented a witness in a 
grand jury investigation of racketeering while he acted at the direction of 
the criminal organization leader, who used Cintolo to ensure that the 
witnesses did not testify.90  Cintolo counseled his “client” to assert the Fifth 
Amendment and, when granted immunity, to refuse to testify and to suffer 
a contempt charge.91  Unknown to the participants in the scheme, the 
government taped conversations regarding Cintolo’s representation, which 
made it clear that Cintolo was not working in his client’s best interest.92 
Cintolo was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice.93  On appeal, he 
argued that he did not have the requisite “corrupt” intent because the legal 
advice was not itself criminal.94  He also argued that the jury should be 
instructed that a legitimate explanation by a lawyer for his conduct in 
advising a client cannot obstruct justice.95  The First Circuit rejected the 
                                                          
 88. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and 
Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 525 (1994) (“Today, corporations depend more than 
ever on lawyers to advise management and to lobby government concerning regulation.  Just 
as the creation of railroads and a banking system in the nineteenth century was a legal as 
well as a business enterprise, legal risks in many of today's highly regulated industries like 
banking, insurance, airlines, and waste management have become business risks.  Even 
apart from industry-specific regulation, regulation of almost every aspect of economic life 
such as the environment, health and safety, employment, and securities ensures that legal 
and business components of corporate decisions are often intertwined.”). 
 89. 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 90. Id. at 984. 
 91. Id. at 984-87. 
 92. Id. at 984-88. 
 93. Id. at 992, 1005. 
 94. Id. at 990. 
 95. Id. 
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arguments because “the acceptance of a retainer by a lawyer in a criminal 
case cannot become functionally equivalent to the lawyer’s acceptance of a 
roving commission to flout the criminal law with impunity.”96 
While the court was correct that a lawyer could obstruct justice by 
advising a client, Cintolo denigrated the nature of legal advice as being 
different from other types of criminal conduct.  The court noted that giving 
a person a ride to the airport or buying a chisel from a hardware store is not 
illegal unless it is a part of a larger scheme to engage in misconduct, 
thereby converting legal acts into illegal conduct.97  According to the First 
Circuit, legal advice is just the same:  “In the most fundamental sense, the 
‘advice’ given by Cintolo in the manipulation of his own client was a 
commodity no different than the chisel or the free ride.  It was legal to 
traffic in the wares, but illegal corruptly to put them to felonious use.”98 
However, legal advice is not a “ware” fetched off a shelf or a fungible 
commodity available for the taking by paying the going rate.  The First 
Circuit misapprehended the nature of legal advice, which is designed to 
assist a client to adhere to the law.  Unlike the chisel or free ride, legal 
advice involves the very possibility that the conduct at issue will be illegal; 
otherwise, there would be no need to consult a lawyer.  When legal advice 
is provided to a client accused of a crime, the role of the criminal defense 
lawyer is, at least in part, to frustrate the system to ensure that only the 
guilty are convicted of a crime.  The lawyer may ethically obstruct the 
criminal justice system by seeking an acquittal of a client, even a guilty 
one.  In a business setting, the lines are less clear because the legal advice 
is prospective and ostensibly designed to avoid a violation rather than how 
to deal with the consequences of one. 
The conviction of Cintolo is certainly justifiable because lawyers can 
cross the line from giving proper legal advice to misusing the tools of the 
criminal justice system to defeat its very purpose.99  Under the obstruction 
of justice statute, it is doubtful Cintolo provided bona fide, legal 
representation services when he sought to shield one person’s criminality 
by manipulating his client.  To call his conduct ethical would be an 
absurdity.  Yet, the view that legal advice is simply a commodity that can 
be misused as easily as any other physical device to commit a crime 
denigrates the importance of the lawyer in the criminal justice system.  If 
legal advice is merely another tool to be misused, then lawyers are as guilty 
as any other person when they defend clients by seeking to avoid their 
                                                          
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 993. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 632 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that the 
adversarial system, and its goal of seeking justice, would be undermined if lawyers were not 
reprimanded for criminal and manipulative conduct). 
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conviction. 
If legal advice is essentially fungible, then targeting lawyers for 
prosecution is a short step to take in expanding the scope of the criminal 
law.  Under this view, the presence of the lawyer is another sign of 
criminality, and so, prosecutors can regard the lawyer as criminally liable 
for giving legal advice that does not prevent others from engaging in 
misconduct.  It is this gatekeeper role of lawyers advising businesses that 
makes legal advice particularly vulnerable to a charge of assisting a client’s 
fraud because the lawyer’s role may be so close to the misconduct that 
prosecutors consider them facilitators of the crime.  For example, in United 
States v. Anderson,100 the government brought a large-scale Medicare fraud 
indictment that included two lawyers in addition to the doctors and hospital 
administrators charged with an array of fraud and conspiracy offenses.101  
The lawyers represented several hospitals in trying to create a legal means 
of compensating two doctors who referred a large number of patients from 
nursing homes to the hospitals.102  The government alleged that the 
lawyers, together with the other defendants whose activities were more 
directly involved in the misconduct, sought to erect a system to provide 
kickbacks to the doctors by disguising illegal referral fees as consulting 
arrangements.103 
Throughout the negotiation process, the lawyers sought to effectuate a 
business arrangement between the hospitals and the doctors in a legal 
manner while operating in an area whose rules are arcane and subject to 
frequent, and often confusing, changes.104  In dismissing the charges 
against the lawyers, the trial judge stated: 
It is undisputed from the evidence that all the lawyers who dealt with or 
reviewed these transactions . . . held good faith beliefs that it was 
possible to facilitate some business relationship between the hospitals 
and [the doctors] . . . . [T]he reversals of field by the OIG [Office of 
Inspector General, United States Department of Health and Human 
Services] concerning its own interpretation, the checkered history of the 
Hanlester [Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995)] case and 
the reservation by Congress of a safe harbor provision in the act (the 
promulgation of regulations concerning which were delayed for a 
considerable time) all invite lawyers to attempt to devise legal ways for 
parties to have a relationship which has as a component hoped-for and 
anticipated referrals . . . . 
                                                          
 100. 85 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Kan. 1999), rev’d by United States v. McClatchey, 217 
F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 101. Id. at 1051. 
 102. Id. at 1055-56. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1060. 
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There were no decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court or from the 
Eighth or Tenth Circuits, where the activities in question were going on, 
to guide them.  What the evidence unassailably demonstrated is that [the 
lawyers] steadfastly maintained to their clients that if fair market value 
were paid for the doctors’ practice or for legitimate consulting services, 
the relationship passed legal scrutiny.  Nothing in the evidence or the law 
suggests otherwise.105 
The lawyers prosecuted in Anderson were trying to craft a legal solution 
for their client to achieve a legitimate business purpose.  The fact that they 
were in an area heavily regulated by the government, and that they 
provided advice regarding conduct that, if done improperly, could have 
resulted in criminal prosecution, put the lawyers at risk of being labeled as 
co-conspirators and participants in a scheme to defraud—even though their 
legal work sought to avoid such an appellation. 
One of the usual accouterments of fraud is that there is an illegal benefit 
derived from the misstatements or omissions used to deceive the victims 
and that the benefit usually comes from the victim, although not always.106  
When the lawyer’s services are part of the scheme, a special payment or 
benefit to the lawyer will be a hallmark of the lawyer’s participation in the 
misconduct, in addition to the provided legal advice, whatever its 
considered worth.107  The mail fraud statute,108 however, has been applied 
to ethical breaches that deprive a client of the lawyer’s undivided loyalty in 
representation, even where a lawyer does not gain any special benefit. 
In United States v. Bronston,109 the government charged a lawyer, who 
was also a state senator, with mail fraud for secretly representing a 
company seeking a city bus shelter contract when his firm already 
represented a competitor seeking the same contract.110  The lawyer’s breach 
of the duty of loyalty owed to his firm’s client constituted fraud.111  The 
Second Circuit found itself “faced with a straight-forward economic fraud 
in which the object of the scheme was not merely to deprive the victims of 
a law firm’s undivided loyalty, for which they paid $52,000, but to deprive 
                                                          
 105. Id. at 1064-65. 
 106. Stephen Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for Lawyers:  Navigating the New 
Realm of Federal Regulation of Legal Ethics, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 609, 615 (2003) (noting 
that lawyers have been prosecuted for their involvement in fraudulent schemes, insider 
trading, and market manipulation). 
 107. See Sylvia E. Stevens, A Fine Line:  When Does Giving Legal Advice Become 
Assisting a Client with Fraud?, 63 OR. ST. B. BULL. 29, 30-32 (listing and describing a 
number of cases in which lawyers were found to have assisted their clients in the 
perpetration of a fraud). 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002). 
 109. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 110. Id. at 922-26. 
 111. Id. at 922. 
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[the client] and its minority investors of the [client’s] franchise.”112  In 
criticizing the decision, Professor John Coffee argued that, 
[H]owever rare the Bronston facts may seem, conflicts of interest are as 
inevitable as death and taxes.  Current law appears to be approaching the 
point of criminalizing a conflict of interest whenever the fiduciary 
knowingly fails to disclose its existence and thereby deprives his 
beneficiary of his “honest and faithful services.”113 
Bronston’s actions likely deprived the firm’s client of the right of honest 
services, at least to the extent that it could count on the lawyers in the firm 
to refrain from helping a competitor.  Now, this type of intangible harm—
the deprivation to the right of honest services—comes specifically within 
the scope of the mail fraud statute:  a lawyer’s ethical violation could be a 
basis for bringing criminal charges, although the client must suffer some 
harm from the breach of duty.114  Because lawyers act as fiduciaries for 
their clients, the extent to which a lawyer acts unethically by not providing 
loyal service to a client could be seen as a scheme to defraud, at least when 
there is some improper benefit to the lawyer or economic loss to the client 
from the ethical breach.115 
If the ethics rules can form the basis of a criminal prosecution, then the 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 929-30. 
 113. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud:  The Continuing Story of the 
“Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1983).  In United States 
v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999), a bankruptcy lawyer’s failure to disclose to the 
court that he had represented other parties with claims against the bankrupt company 
resulted in a conviction for bankruptcy fraud.  Like Bronston, there was no evidence of an 
economic harm to the client, but unlike Bronston, the lawyer misled the court in connection 
with being appointed as counsel for the bankrupt company.  Id. at 587-88.  While both cases 
involved a conflict of interest, the real lesson of Gellene is that lawyers who actively 
mislead a court will be convicted, regardless of whether there is any direct economic harm. 
In United States v. Drury, 687 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit upheld a lawyer’s 
conviction of mail fraud for not disclosing to his clients that he received a fifteen percent 
kickback of the medical fees from a physician to whom the lawyer referred his personal 
injury clients.  The court found that the lawyer breached his fiduciary duty to his clients by 
concealing the financial arrangements with the physician “and consequently and 
surreptitiously pocket[ing] a larger fee than that he had agreed on with the client.”  Id. at 65.  
Unlike Bronston, the lawyer used his clients to enrich himself, not necessarily at their 
expense, but certainly without regard to their interest in paying the lowest fee possible for 
legal representation. 
 114. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2002) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or 
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of 
honest services.”). 
 115. See Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and the Mail Fraud Statute, 48 BROOK. L.  REV. 653, 659 (1982) (“If the local 
leader of a political party, who is not a public officeholder, can be convicted of mail fraud 
for depriving citizens of their right to honest government, no major conceptual leap is 
required to argue that a lawyer who deprives the public of its right to the honest 
administration of justice should also be held liable.  If the provisions of the proposed Model 
Rules do tilt toward a concern for society at large, an issue that will not be debated here, 
intentional violations of rules such as Rule 3.3 may well support future charges of mail 
fraud.”). 
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next step may be the pursuit of lawyers for their representation of clients 
that, while not unethical, fails to prevent misconduct.  A recent indictment 
of a lawyer for his representation of a corporate client by the Department of 
Justice may indicate this expansion of the scope of potential criminal 
liability for lawyers.  In United States v. Munson,116 the government 
indicted the executives of an energy trading subsidiary of a utility company 
along with Munson, the corporation’s outside counsel, for securities and 
mail fraud for submitting false financial statements.117  The indictment 
alleged that Munson helped the executives “pump up” the company’s 
earnings by “stretching fiscal recognition of a $1.25 million settlement” 
over two fiscal years, thereby lowering the company’s expenses and 
increasing its earnings.118  Munson represented the subsidiary in the 
settlement, but the indictment does not discuss how his legal representation 
related to the fraudulent accounting of the settlement.119  Moreover, while 
the executives received bonuses based on meeting certain financial goals, 
the indictment alleges only that Munson “sought to please a client . . . from 
whom he hoped to obtain additional legal business and eventual 
employment,” including being appointed as general counsel for the 
subsidiary.120  
The case is still in the pre-trial phase, and so, the government has not yet 
brought forth its proof.  The indictment, however, contains no allegation 
that Munson’s legal advice to the corporate client was relevant to the 
accounting treatment of the expense, nor does it contain an allegation that 
he breached any fiduciary obligation to the client.121  Moreover, his gain 
from the fraudulent scheme, unlike the monetary benefits reaped by the 
company’s executives, consists of the vague “hope[] to obtain additional 
legal business” and perhaps being hired as the client’s in-house counsel.122  
It is axiomatic that lawyers seek to continue their representation of clients, 
either in the current matter or in future legal issues.  Indeed, one of the 
benefits of retaining a lawyer on a long-term basis is the cost-savings for 
clients who then have a lawyer familiar with their legal needs and who 
establishes a good working relationship with the officers and managers of 
                                                          
 116. No. 03 CR 1153, 03 CR 1154, 2004 WL 1672880 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2004). 
 117. See id. at *1 (outlining Munson’s manipulation of the company’s earnings 
statements to make it appear more profitable than it truly was by violating accepted 
accounting principles when structuring the payment of a $1.25 million dollar settlement to 
another utility company). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See United States v. Stoffer, No. 03CR1153, 2003 WL 23145605 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 
2003) (focusing on how Munson worked with executives in an attempt to make the 
company appear more profitable through accounting principles as opposed to examining the 
impact Munson’s legal advice had on the company). 
 120. Id. at ¶¶ 1.f, 3. 
 121. See generally Stoffer, 2003 WL 23145605. 
 122. Id. at ¶¶ 1.f, 3. 
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the company interacting with the lawyer on a regular basis. 
There is nothing wrong with “hoping” for future legal business, as long 
as the lawyer provides competent representation and maintains the requisite 
independence from the client.  Tellingly, the indictment of Munson does 
not make any reference to his shaping legal advice to curry favor with the 
client or his using information from the representation to favor his own 
position to the detriment of the client, which would be a breach of his 
ethical duties.123  Unlike Bronston, in which the lawyer’s ethical breach can 
be viewed as having harmed the client’s interest by helping a competitor, in 
this case, the government appears to have indicted the lawyer because he 
did not prevent the wrongdoing from occurring.  In this sense, the lawyer’s 
failure to undertake a gatekeeper role, rather than any specific problem 
with the legal advice offered to the client, appears to be the criminal 
conduct.  It may be that Munson conspired with the other executives to 
mislead the parent corporation or altered documents to conceal the 
fraudulent accounting, but the indictment contains no indication that such 
events occurred.  Instead, it appears that the lawyer was not charged for 
misconduct in his role as counsel to the company, but rather, was charged 
with being at the scene of the crime and not doing anything to stop it, 
apparently with the “hope” of gaining future business. 
III. TARGETING LEGAL ADVICE 
Lawyers can be held accountable for the legal advice that they provide to 
clients in a number of ways.  Malpractice suits provide clients with a means 
of redress when the lawyer was negligent in the representation.  Similarly, 
even if the lawyer was not negligent, a breach of fiduciary duty can result 
in an award of damages or a return of the legal fees.  Each state maintains 
an extensive disciplinary apparatus for reviewing complaints against 
lawyers and can impose sanctions against lawyers ranging from private 
admonitions to suspensions and even disbarment for serious misconduct.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,124 adopted in 2002 in the wake of spectacular 
corporate failures involving large corporations like Enron and Worldcom, 
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to impose 
an ethical obligation on lawyers of publicly-traded corporations to report 
wrongdoing within the corporation to senior management and to the board 
of directors.125  Judges have not hesitated to hold lawyers in contempt for 
                                                          
 123. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b) (2002) (“A lawyer shall not use 
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the 
client gives informed consent . . . .”). 
 124. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.). 
 125. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. 2004).  Section 7245 provides: 
Not later than 180 days after July 30, 2002, the Commission shall issue rules, in the 
HENNING 10/3/2005  1:35 PM 
692 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:669 
misconduct during litigation, and lawyers are not shy about complaining 
about the conduct of opposing counsel by seeking disqualification. 
While the effectiveness of these means to redress wrongdoing by 
lawyers is open to question, the profession does not operate without 
oversight by both administrative bodies and the judiciary.  As prosecutors 
use the criminal law with greater frequency to pursue charges against 
lawyers for conduct that would have been the subject of a disciplinary or 
malpractice action in an earlier time, the issue becomes one of the 
appropriateness of the regulation of lawyers through the criminal process.  
As Professor Bruce Green notes, “The criminal law’s regulatory role is 
most interesting, and potentially troubling, in situations where the criminal 
law points lawyers in one direction but other professional norms, such as 
those embodied in the lawyer codes, appear to point lawyers in the opposite 
direction.”126 
The issue now has expanded into whether legal advice has become an 
obstruction to criminal investigations and prosecutions such that the mere 
presence of a lawyer is indicia of guilt and a sign that the person is not 
cooperating with the government.  The SEC’s Director of Enforcement, 
Stephen Cutler, stated in a speech: 
One area of particular focus for us is the role of lawyers in internal 
investigations of their clients or companies.  We are concerned that, in 
some instances, lawyers may have conducted investigations in such a 
manner as to help hide ongoing fraud, or may have taken actions to 
actively obstruct such investigations.127 
A lawyer who orders the destruction of documents or removal of 
electronic files from a server to keep them from the government would 
clearly be guilty of obstruction of justice.  Now, however, internal 
investigations are standard whenever there is even a hint of impropriety at a 
                                                          
public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards 
of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the 
Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including a rule— 
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law 
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent 
thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or 
the equivalent thereof); and 
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence 
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to 
the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee 
of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of 
directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the 
issuer, or to the board of directors. 
 126. Green, supra note 63, at 391-92. 
 127. Stephen M. Cutler, The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected in the 
Commission’s Enforcement Program, Speech at the UCLA School of Law (Sept. 20, 2004), 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
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corporation.  In such a situation, the lawyer’s advice to the company and its 
employees could be to not respond to the government’s request for 
interviews and to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege until corporate 
counsel completes an investigation.  Would that directive obstruct an 
investigation? 
While the destruction of documents is surely criminal, Mr. Cutler’s 
statement may include more than what is prohibited already by criminal 
law because one would certainly hope that the SEC is vigilant regarding 
such flagrant misconduct.  The question is whether legal advice, given to a 
corporation to not cooperate with the government and to resist a subpoena 
for records, or advice given to individual employees that they can assert 
their Fifth Amendment rights would be “obstruction” in the eyes of the 
SEC.  There is nothing illegal about this advice, but once again, the 
lawyer’s involvement may be viewed as inherently suspect, at least until 
the company agrees to cooperate fully.  If there is a suspicion that lawyers 
act to obstruct justice without violating the ethical rules—indeed, when 
acting ethically—then the results of an internal investigation will not be 
trustworthy because it was tainted by a lawyer seeking to protect the 
corporate client who conducted the review. 
The Thompson Memorandum takes that suspicion of lawyers to a higher 
level by making waivers of the attorney-client privilege and the work 
product protection a strong indicia of cooperation.128  It has the following 
as a general principle: 
In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation’s timely 
and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate 
with the government’s investigation may be relevant factors.  In gauging 
the extent of the corporation’s cooperation, the prosecutor may consider 
the corporation’s willingness to identify the culprits within the 
corporation, including senior executives; to make witnesses available; to 
disclose the complete results of its internal investigation; and to waive 
attorney-client and work product protection.129 
The DOJ explains that waivers assist its investigations because they 
“permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, 
subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or 
immunity agreements.”130  Those are the very agreements that lawyers for 
individuals would extract from the government as the price for the 
cooperation of an officer or employee.  By having the corporation conduct 
at least the first phase of the investigation, the government can obtain 
statements that a lawyer would otherwise advise a client not to make 
                                                          
 128. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.A. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at VI.B. 
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without the protection of an immunity agreement or plea bargain. 
Some have criticized the “waiver” as hardly voluntary because of the 
coercive effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines131 and the ease with 
which a corporation can be proven guilty under the principle of respondeat 
superior.132  A Comment to the Thompson Memorandum states that the 
DOJ “does not, however, consider waiver of a corporation’s attorney-client 
and work product protection an absolute requirement.”133  However, this 
provides cold comfort to corporate counsel assessing whether to waive the 
protections afforded to lawyers conducting internal investigations, because 
the determination of whether a corporation has sufficiently cooperated is 
completely within the DOJ’s discretion.134  Moreover, corporate counsel 
have questioned whether they will receive complete cooperation from 
employees if it is known that what is said or provided in the internal 
investigation will be turned over to the government and, in all likelihood, to 
private litigants. 
The government simply is not lazy by seeking the waiver to obtain the 
complete results of the internal investigation.  It is, instead, symptomatic of 
the DOJ’s mistrust of lawyers, who can use the shield of the attorney-client 
privilege and the work product protection to safeguard the content of their 
internal investigation and, potentially, make it more difficult for the 
government to fully investigate corporate misconduct.  If lawyers tell their 
clients not to cooperate with the government without some protection—
either a grant of immunity or a plea agreement—then perhaps the 
corporation will obtain the statements that will spare the government from 
having to pay the price for such cooperation.  However, it is unlikely that 
the government will accept the conclusions of an internal investigation 
uncritically or forego its own investigation simply because the 
                                                          
 131. See Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges:  Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-Front 
Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 
537-38 (2002) (claiming that the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines pressure companies to 
cooperate with the government to receive a lower culpability score); see also U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. § 8C2.5(g) (2003) (outlining the mitigating effect 
of a corporation’s self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility).  But see 
Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of 
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 608 (2004) (noting that Application Note 
12 to § 8C2.5 was recently amended to clarify that a waiver is not always a prerequisite to a 
lower culpability score). 
 132. See Cole, supra note 131, at 543 (arguing that allowing prosecutors to consider a 
corporation’s willingness to waive the attorney-client privilege and the work product 
protection “go[es] quite far toward effectively forcing a corporation to waive privilege 
protections if it hopes to obtain favorable charging treatment at the hands of DOJ 
prosecutors”). 
 133. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.B. 
 134. But see Buchanan, supra note 131, at 597 (“[C]laims that the sanctity of the 
attorney-client privilege is being undermined by the Department’s assessment of 
cooperation by organizational defendants are greatly overstated.  In any case, the decision to 
waive the privilege must be made by the corporation.”). 
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corporation’s lawyers have already conducted one.  Nonetheless, the 
waiver gives prosecutors some assurance that they have not missed 
anything protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product 
protection.  It allows them to consider charges without having to make 
deals with officers or employees to obtain information. 
This fear of legal advice is further shown by a Comment to the 
Thompson Memorandum where the DOJ identifies conduct that can 
demonstrate a lack of cooperation from an organization that “appears to be 
protecting its culpable employees and agents:” 
[A] corporation’s promise of support to culpable employees and agents, 
either through the advancing of attorneys fees, through retaining the 
employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing 
information to the employees about the government’s investigation 
pursuant to a joint defense agreement, may be considered by the 
prosecutor in weighing the extent and value of a corporation’s 
cooperation.135 
The Comment contains a footnote acknowledging that some states 
require the payment of attorney’s fees and that “a corporation’s compliance 
with governing law should not be considered a failure to cooperate.”136  
What the footnote does not address is whether a contractual obligation to 
provide attorney’s fees that is authorized, but not compelled, by a state’s 
corporate law, would be considered inappropriate support.137 
Ethics rules require that a lawyer may not represent multiple clients 
when a potential conflict of interest between their positions exists, or if the 
lawyer’s representation of one client would limit the representation of a 
second.138  An investigation of a corporation and its officers and employees 
                                                          
 135. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.B. 
 136. Id. at VI.B n.4. 
 137. For example, Delaware law allows a corporation to enter into agreements for the 
payment of expenses beyond what is required by its law.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) 
(2001).  Another provision permits a corporation to advance the attorney’s fees of an officer 
or director in a criminal investigation or prosecution “upon receipt of an undertaking by or 
on behalf of such director or officer to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be 
determined that such person is not entitled” to receive attorney’s fees from the company.  Id. 
§ 145(e).  Would a contract or by-law provision requiring the advancement of attorney’s 
fees to an officer show that the corporation is not cooperating with the government? 
 138. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2002).  It provides: 
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest . . ., a lawyer may 
represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against 
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding 
before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
Id. 
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will almost certainly require that each individual be represented by separate 
counsel, especially if the government plans to seek the cooperation of one 
or more of the investigative targets to testify against the others.  Payment of 
the attorney’s fees of an officer or employee during an investigation may 
well be in the corporation’s best interest because its own culpability will be 
based on the conduct of the officers.  The presence of the lawyers will, 
however, frustrate the government’s investigation, which the Thompson 
Memorandum views as a basis for seeking to have the corporation waive its 
privileges.139 
By discouraging corporations from paying for separate counsel, the 
government uses the ethical prohibition on conflicts of interest to obtain 
information from individuals that it might not otherwise be able to get.  
Counsel for the corporation cannot give legal advice to individual officers 
without running afoul of the conflict rules, and, if paying for a separate 
lawyer will be a sign of non-cooperation, the corporation is unlikely to 
suggest that the employee obtain his or her own lawyer before cooperating 
in the investigation, lest it appear to be shielding the employee.  This puts 
corporate counsel in a precarious position under the ethics rules if the 
employee thinks the lawyer represents the individual, and the lawyer fails 
to correct that misperception.140 
If the government requires corporate counsel to ensure that individuals 
cooperate with internal investigations as a condition to finding that the 
corporation itself cooperated, then the Thompson Memorandum seeks to 
take advantage of an individual’s lack of knowledge and willingness to 
help an employer.  Proof of corporate cooperation may be contingent on 
showing that no lawyers other than the corporation’s were present and that 
all privilege and work product claims can be waived.  This approach views 
lawyers, who are not subject to the government’s coercive power over the 
corporation, as likely to frustrate investigations.  Therefore, they must not 
be present if the government wishes to accomplish its goal. 
The premise of the DOJ’s view that the payment of attorney’s fees 
signals a lack of cooperation is that the corporation may be shielding a 
“culpable” employee.141  Apparently, providing a lawyer to a person who is 
guilty seems to be sure indicia of an uncooperative organization.  The 
                                                          
 139. See generally Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.A. 
 140. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d) (2002) (“In dealing with an 
organization’s directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a 
lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the 
lawyer is dealing.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2002) (“When a lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the 
lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the 
misunderstanding.”). 
 141. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.B. 
HENNING 10/3/2005  1:35 PM 
2005] TARGETING LEGAL ADVICE 697 
problem is that “culpable” is not defined anywhere, and surely it cannot 
mean “guilty” because there has not been any adjudication of criminal 
liability at the point when the DOJ considers whether to charge the 
corporation with a crime.  The Thompson Memorandum seems to include 
any person who the government believes engaged in wrongdoing as 
“culpable,” and therefore, not worthy of receiving any benefit from the 
corporation, regardless of the phase of the investigation. 
An inquiry into possible corporate misconduct occurs before, not after, 
charges are filed because it is not clear whether a crime occurred.  Any 
determination of culpability, therefore, must wait at least until the 
government has probable cause that a person committed an offense and 
files an indictment.  Yet, the Thompson Memorandum treats virtually any 
employee who might be involved in misconduct as culpable well before the 
investigation is complete.  This turns the presumption of innocence on its 
head because a corporation that does not immediately turn on a potentially 
culpable employee has not cooperated and may suffer an indictment itself. 
The government’s suspicion of the corporation’s cooperative spirit is 
further heightened if there is a joint defense agreement.  Generally, courts 
have been supportive of these types of agreements as a means to share 
information among those with a common interest to facilitate their legal 
defense without risking the complete loss of the attorney-client privilege.142  
Yet, the Thompson Memorandum views these agreements as a sign that the 
corporation is not cooperative in the government’s investigation.143  The 
internal investigation becomes much more difficult if conducted in an 
atmosphere of distrust, yet the government seeks to take advantage of the 
corporation’s presumed authority over its employees to obtain statements it 
might otherwise be unable to access.144 
A joint defense agreement allows lawyers for individuals to monitor the 
investigation and makes it easier to formulate a common defense, thereby 
making the government’s investigation more difficult.  Like the payment of 
attorney’s fees, the joint defense agreement enhances the ability of the 
lawyer to defend the client, and therefore, is something the DOJ views with 
great suspicion. 
The rationale for the Thompson Memorandum is that “[t]oo often 
                                                          
 142. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir.  1989) (“The joint 
defense privilege, more properly identified as the ‘common interest rule,’ . . . has been 
described as ‘an extension of the attorney client privilege,’ . . . .  It serves to protect the 
confidentiality of communications passing from one party to the attorney for another party 
where a joint defense effort or strategy has been decided upon and undertaken by the parties 
and their respective counsel.”). 
 143. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI. 
 144. See Finder, supra note 19, at 112 (remarking that a company facing an internal 
investigation now considers it problematic for relationships among employees, 
management, and the board of directors). 
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business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a Department 
investigation, in fact take steps to impede the quick and effective exposure 
of the complete scope of wrongdoing under investigation.”145  This 
presupposes, of course, that criminal conduct has taken place and that the 
corporation and its employees are responsible, so that the only issue for the 
government is to identify the culprits and bring them to justice.  
Corporations certainly commit crimes, but it is not always immediately 
apparent that criminal conduct has taken place at the start of an 
investigation.  Unlike ordinary street crimes, such as theft or drug-dealing, 
which are obviously criminal, economic crimes often involve business 
transactions that are not inherently wrongful.146  While everyone assumes 
that Enron was rife with criminality, the actual causes of its demise were 
not theft or embezzlement, but rather, involved the use of sophisticated 
financial vehicles and transactions that are recognized as perfectly 
legitimate in most circumstances.147 
If the assumption is that every investigation of organizational 
misconduct will result in a criminal conviction, then the DOJ’s disdain for 
lawyers would be defensible.  But it is not always the case that the 
corporation and its officers are engaged in wrongdoing.  In a recent 
prosecution of two mid-level executives from the K-Mart Corporation who 
were accused of securities fraud, the government dismissed the charges 
after its second witness contradicted her earlier grand jury testimony about 
the receipt of documents that showed the defendants had not tried to 
                                                          
 145. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at Introduction. 
 146. See Green, supra note 13, at 510 ( 
Not only does white collar crime present difficulties in assessing the means by 
which it is committed, the harms it causes, and the victims it affects, but there are 
also problems in determining exactly who (or what, in the case of an entity) should 
be held responsible.  Many of the offenses referred to above are most likely to 
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 147. See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May”, 
48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1245-46 (2003) (“Enron is largely a story about derivatives—
financial instruments such as options, futures, and other contracts whose value is linked to 
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most prominent SPE [Special Purpose Entity] transactions were largely irrelevant to Enron’s 
collapse, and that most of Enron’s deals with SPEs were arguably legal, even though 
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SPEs—not the SPEs themselves—that matter.  Even more important were Enron’s 
derivatives trades and transactions other than those involving the SPEs.”). 
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deceive the company about the accounting for a transaction.148  Similarly, 
the charges against the individuals arising from the Salt Lake City Olympic 
bid scandal were dismissed at the close of the government’s case, and the 
district court judge stated that the government’s case had offended his 
sense of justice.149  Unlike the view of NYPD Blue, that “lawyering up” is 
only done by guilty suspects to thwart an investigation, corporate officers 
and employees do not necessarily act illegally in every instance, and their 
reliance on lawyers is not designed simply to frustrate the government’s 
investigation of clear wrongdoing. 
CONCLUSION 
The world might be a better place without lawyers, although I doubt it.  
We hear quite frequently the quotation from Shakespeare’s Henry VI (Part 
II)150—“The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”151  However, we 
are not quite sure how to react.  Leave it to lawyers—and legal 
academics—to argue whether that line was meant as a true wish for a better 
world without lawyers or a compliment to lawyers because of their ability 
to guard against despotism.152  However, lawyers are recognized as 
important in the civil arena and constitutionally required in many criminal 
cases.  As Justice Stevens noted in a dissenting opinion: 
If the Government, in the guise of a paternalistic interest in protecting 
the citizen from his own improvidence, can deny him access to 
independent counsel of his choice, it can change the character of our free 
society.  Even though a dispute with the sovereign may only involve 
property rights, . . . the citizen’s right of access to the independent, 
private bar is itself an aspect of liberty that is of critical importance in 
our democracy.153 
In the name of investigating corporate crime, the DOJ has given 
expression to a mistrust of lawyers as little more than hindrances to the 
protection of society from wrongdoing.  We are told, in effect, that lawyers 
cannot be trusted because their ethical rules permit them to obstruct justice, 
                                                          
 148. See David Ashenfelter & Greta Guest, Charges Tossed in Kmart Crime Case, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 8, 2003, at A1. 
 149. See Mike Gorrell & Linda Fantin, Acquitted, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 6, 2003, at A1 
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and their advice to clients to assert their constitutional rights makes it 
appreciably more difficult to investigate and to prosecute economic crimes 
committed by corporations and their officers and employees. 
However, the DOJ’s suspicion of lawyers and the targeting of legal 
advice as something to be limited or eliminated if possible from corporate 
crime investigations are steps toward viewing all such allegations of 
misconduct as proven unless—and until—determined otherwise.  I submit 
that this approach takes the issue of overcriminalization to a new level by 
making the provision of proper legal advice an indicia of criminality and an 
instrumentality to be removed from the hands of those subject to a criminal 
investigation in much the same way an officer would take a weapon or 
contraband from a suspect. 
 
